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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Executive Summary
In this study, we seek to understand the nature of collaborations between organizations working in the food insecurity and food 
desert1 social spaces in Houston, Texas. Within many neighborhoods, 
the lack of ready access to healthy foods such as fresh fruits, 
vegetables and whole grains combines with low incomes, and other 
factors related to transportation, time, ability and proclivity to cook 
to make food insecurity and food deserts a reality for many persons. 
An estimated 724,750 food insecure individuals live in the Greater 
Houston area with a food insecurity rate of 16.6 percent, about 4 
percentage points above the national average. Over 500,000 Houston 
residents live in United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)-
designated food desert areas.1 Food insecurity and food deserts have 
grave effects on individual and community health. According to the 
Harris County Healthcare Alliance’s 2015–2016 The State of Health 
report, about two-thirds of the area’s adult residents were overweight 
and about one-third was obese,2 with variation across ethnicity. In 
Harris County, about one in three children is likely to be obese and 
about one in three children born since 2000 is likely to develop 
diabetes.3 These health challenges result in additional health care 
costs of $3 billion in just Harris County.4
1 We define both of these terms in the report. At times, we use these terms interchangeably.
The many factors behind food insecurity and food deserts as well as the wide range of impacts at 
the individual, neighborhood, city and metropolitan levels suggest that solutions will likely require 
inputs from and sustained cooperation across a number of organizations, including governments 
at all levels, nonprofit organizations and private sector, for-profit firms or businesses. We call this 
systemic collaboration. Systemic refers to the involvement of a collective set of organizations, 
2 Rice University Kinder Institute for Urban Research
institutions and other stakeholders in the overall system. 
Collaboration refers to the formal and informal non-hier-
archical partnerships between these entities to collectively 
formulate and implement strategies, programs and inter-
ventions towards achieving collective impact at the sys-
tem level.5 The literature suggests that such widespread 
collaborations need to be practiced over a long time to be 
effective at the community level.6
To do our study, we followed the standard protocols of 
qualitative research using multiple approaches to collect 
data: semi-structured interviews, experiential field visits 
and focus groups of individuals living in one food desert 
neighborhood.7 Our interviews and visits occurred over 
a course of 33 months beginning in October 2015 through 
June 2018. In all, this process yielded 58 interviews with 
75 individuals at 39 organizations. In addition, we consult-
ed secondary data sources such as surveys, reports and 
academic studies to identify, clarify, probe and validate 
information obtained through our primary sources.
Our analysis reveals the existence in Houston of many 
collaborations across different types of organizations, 
including nonprofit organizations, businesses, govern-
mental agencies, schools and universities and funders. 
Most of these collaborations, however, were narrow in 
scope and oftentimes involved delivering a single inter-
vention. Through the research, we identified four types 
of collaborations in the Houston food insecurity and food 
deserts space. First, we found several dominant player 
supply chain collaborations, including the Houston 
Food Bank’s relationships with its food vendors and pan-
tries, plus several of its Food for Change partners. Second, 
we observed several neighborhood wrap-around 
collaborations. Those collaborations focus on users who 
frequent a food pantry and require a dedicated director 
and staff to assess the holistic needs of their clients and 
connect them to other social services. Third, we saw one 
umbrella collaboration, operating in Pasadena but cur-
rently defunct, although portions of it continue to operate 
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discretely. The umbrella had many partners and was 
closest to a systemic collaboration of all collaborations 
observed. Finally, we identified a few informational 
collaborations. In these collaborations, an organization 
will collect and disseminate information about users, 
programs, funders, events, public policies, etc. to other 
organizations. However, none of these collaborations ap-
proximated the systemic collaboration that would require 
a variegated set of organizations rallying in unison over 
an extended period to solve such an important issue.
Our study thus turned on identifying the factors driving 
the formation of systemic collaborations. We focused on 
identifying factors leading organizations to enter into as 
well as refrain from or pull away from such collabora-
tions. First, we identified two factors that direct organiza-
tions towards systemic collaborations, which we termed 
problem ambiguity and user ambiguity. Problem ambi-
guity refers to how much variance exists around the defi-
nition, scope and goals of the social problem. User am-
biguity refers to the variance that exists as to whom the 
users are, what their needs are and to what extent they 
should be involved in solving the problem. Increasing 
problem ambiguity and user ambiguity sets the potential 
for the emergence of one of two contradictory outcomes. 
On one hand, as the levels of problem ambiguity and user 
ambiguity rise, the need and urgency for systemic col-
laboration becomes more apparent. On the other hand, 
such high levels of ambiguity across both dimensions 
also enable fragmentation and encourage organizations to 
pursue their efforts independently or within a narrow col-
laboration to focus upon their own particular definitions 
of the problem and user.
We find that the institutional context greatly influences 
which outcome emerges. Specifically, in the context of 
food insecurity we find that two factors push organizations 
away from systemic collaborations. The first, which we 
term institutional barriers, stems from funders, govern-
ment policies and politics. In some instances, these institu-
tional players set up expectations, rules, requirements and 
resources that create disincentives for systemic collabora-
tions. A second factor working against systemic collabo-
ration is a mindset of competition. We observed many 
organizations (and their managers, founders and direc-
tors), including nonprofits, push for resources and market 
dominance, sometimes at the expense of cooperation. We 
believe that institutional barriers and the mindset of com-
petition combine to discourage systemic collaborations.
Our study thus highlights the need for funding agencies, 
government and organizations to revisit some of the as-
sumptions underlying their strategies in the social sphere. 
We offer several remedies aimed at funders, government 
policies, the mindset of altruism and backbone organiza-
tions that suggest adopting policies, processes and mind-
sets that encourage collaborations, promote flexibility of 
operations, adopt more behavioral metrics and eschew 
competitive actions. We argue that adoption of such 
remedies is essential if we are to make substantial strides 
towards effectively addressing significant social issues in 
not just Houston but also other parts of the world.
Key Findings
1. Solving food insecurity issues requires systemic 
collaboration between many organizations 
transcending multiple sectors, rallying in unison over 
a significant period.
2. We find four types of collaborations: dominant player 
supply chain collaborations, neighborhood wrap-
around collaborations, umbrella collaborations and 
informational collaborators. However, none of these 
are systemic collaborations.
3. Two factors emerge to create an environment 
that both encourages the formation of systemic 
collaborations as well as promotes fragmentation: 
problem ambiguity and user ambiguity.
4. Two factors push organizations away from systemic 
collaborations: institutional barriers and the mindset 
of competition. The result is fragmented, narrow 
interventions resulting in significant gaps in service 
provision that ultimately fail to improve impact at the 
community level.
5. We offer remedies aimed at funders, government 
policies, mindset of altruism and backbone 
organizations that require them to adopt to 
policies, processes and mindsets that encourage 
collaborations, promote flexibility of operations and 
adopt more behavioral metrics while eschewing 
competitive actions.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Houston is the fourth largest city in the United States, located in the Texas Gulf Coast, with a 2017 population of nearly 2.3 million and over 4.6 million in 
Harris County within which the city lies. Despite being one of the fastest growing 
cities in the United States and an economic juggernaut, Houston suffers a myriad of 
economic, social and health problems, including food insecurity, defined as a lack of 
consistent access to enough food for an active, healthy life.
Our project aims to understand the mechanisms be-
hind the collaborative efforts of various organizations to 
address food insecurity in Houston, an issue related to in-
dividual and public health. Two aspects of food insecurity 
make it worthy of investigation: the problem is broadly 
important across our community, as it is detrimental 
to individuals and many neighborhoods, and different 
organizations tackle different aspects of it with varying 
degrees of coordination.
The first aspect of food insecurity—that it is a broad 
social problem of significance to Houston—puts it in a 
category of collective impact. Collective impact involves 
actors from different sectors committing to a common 
agenda to solve a social problem.8 Examples of collective 
impact include programs and interventions that aim to 
raise educational outcomes for students, to provide better 
employment opportunities for disadvantaged persons, to 
improve the conditions of neighborhoods and to miti-
gate hunger. According to a report published by Feeding 
America, more than 700,000 people in Harris County 
remain afflicted by food insecurity.9 While these numbers 
fortunately have been ticking downward, those food inse-
cure individuals face many other barriers. Food insecure 
persons are more likely to suffer from health maladies, 
including obesity, diabetes and coronary disease and may 
lag on socio-emotional health.10 They are also more likely 
to miss work and lose productivity and earning power 
than non-food insecure individuals.11 For those individu-
als and neighborhoods where it is prevalent, food insecu-
rity is a grave problem.
The second aspect is that food insecurity is more than 
likely a problem too big for any one organization to tackle 
alone. The corollary is that credible solutions will require 
input from and cooperation across a number of organi-
zations, including governments at all levels, nonprofit 
organizations and private sector, for-profit firms or 
businesses. We call this systemic collaboration. Systemic 
refers to the involvement of a collective set of organiza-
tions, institutions and stakeholders in the overall system. 
Collaboration refers to the formal and informal non-hi-
erarchical partnerships between these entities to col-
lectively formulate and implement strategies, programs 
and interventions towards achieving collective impact at 
the system level.12 One of the more famous examples of 
systemic collaboration is from Finland regarding collec-
tive efforts to reduce the high levels of coronary disease. 
Over a roughly 20-year period, “specific services in North 
Karelia, Finland were provided exclusively by existing 
public health and medical personnel, although reorga-
nized to some extent,”13 as well as extensive contributions 
by businesses, farmers, civil society organizations and 
mothers.14 This systemic collaboration led to astonish-
ing improvements in individual and community health: 
cardiovascular illness and mortality decreased by over 
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80 percent in a 30-year period. What is impressive is that 
many of the organizations had to adjust what they were 
previously doing in order to contribute to the collective 
good. Equally impressive is that many of these orga-
nizations and individuals contributed without explicit 
direction.15 While the research design of our study is not 
oriented toward formally testing hypotheses, we wish to 
discover the extent to which the organizational efforts in 
Houston approach the systemic collaborations seen in 
places like Finland.
In this report, we describe the results of a 33-month in-
vestigation of organizations working in and around food 
insecurity in Houston. Pointedly, our study focuses on the 
factors influencing organizations to cooperate with other 
organizations as well as factors leading organizations to 
refrain from and/or pull away from such collaborations. 
Using a variety of qualitative techniques, we identified 
two factors that direct organizations towards certain 
types of collaborations, including systemic collaborations 
necessary for collective impact. The first factor is what we 
call problem ambiguity and refers to how much variance 
exists around the definition, scope and goals associated 
with the problem. The second factor, user ambiguity 
refers to the variance that exists as to who the users are, 
what their needs are and to what extent they should be 
involved in solving the problem. Increasing problem 
ambiguity and user ambiguity sets the potential for the 
emergence of one of two contradictory outcomes. On 
one hand, increasing ambiguity highlights the need and 
urgency for systemic collaboration. On the other, such 
ambiguity also enables fragmentation and dissipation 
of efforts by enabling different entities to focus on their 
particular definitions of the problem and user. We find 
that the institutional context influences which outcome 
emerges. Specifically, in the context of food insecurity we 
find that two factors push organizations away from sys-
temic collaborations. The first, which we term institution-
al barriers, stem from funders, government policies and 
politics. In some instances, these institutional players set 
up expectations, rules, requirements and resources that 
create disincentives for systemic collaborations. A second 
factor against systemic collaboration is a mindset of 
competition. We observed many organizations (and their 
managers, founders and directors), including nonprofits, 
push for resources and market dominance, sometimes at 
the expense of cooperation. We believe that institutional 
barriers and the mindset of competition combine to dis-
suade systemic collaborations. Finally, we offer remedies 
geared toward funders, government policies, a mindset of 
altruism and backbone organizations that need to be ad-
opted by these entities if we are to collectively impact the 
significant social issues not just in Houston but in other 
parts of the world.
INTRODUCTION
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We use food insecurity and food deserts inter-changeably16 throughout this report, although 
they connote different but related issues. The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) defines food inse-
curity as “reports of reduced quality, variety, or desir-
ability of diet.” For low severity cases, such reports reveal 
“little or no indication of reduced food intake” and for 
high severity cases, they include “multiple indications 
of disrupted eating patterns and reduced food intake.”17 
In urban contexts within developed countries, such as 
Houston, the vast majority of people purchase food at the 
marketplace: grocery stores, convenience stores, restau-
rants, etc. In such circumstances, food insecurity means 
an individual faces impediments to purchasing foods at 
these venues. Impediments may include individual-level 
income and disposable income; eligibility for and use of 
government food programs, such as the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); factors influenc-
ing food prices, such as natural disasters, transportation 
costs and international trade; as well as factors influenc-
ing alternative means to obtain foods within urban areas 
such as urban farms and community gardens. Although 
food insecurity is declining across the United States, those 
experiencing food insecurity tend to suffer from many 
unmet needs, including hunger.18
Food deserts, on the other hand, refer to locations in a 
geographic space inhabited by low-income individuals 
who “lack access to affordable fruits, vegetables, whole 
grains, low-fat milks, and other foods that make up a 
full and healthy diet.”19 The USDA defines food deserts 
in terms of access of low-income individuals to healthy 
food sources. To qualify as a “low-access community,” at 
least 500 people and/or at least 33 percent of the census 
tract’s population must reside more than one mile from 
a supermarket or large grocery store in an urban area, 
though others have argued for different parameters. 
Furthermore, food deserts can contain many sourc-
es of unhealthy foods, such as fast foods. These have 
been termed food swamps.20 The overall picture is that 
persons living in food deserts do not have easy access to 
locally situated healthy foods, which is associated with re-
duced physical and mental well-being for the residents.21
We also wish to explain up front several limitations of 
this report. First, although our research methods, as ex-
plained in the Appendix, allowed us to collect data from a 
large number of organizations and individuals, we do not 
claim to have covered every organization and intervention 
for food insecurity in Houston. We readily admit that we 
may have missed several important organizations, collab-
orations and interventions. We believe, however, that our 
methodology still allows us to make credible inferences 
about systemic collaborations. Second, we collected data 
over only a 33-month period. As we argue later in this 
report, the type of outcomes of systemic collaborations or 
even less expansive collaboration types may not manifest 
for many years. Third, we do not endorse any organiza-
tions or interventions. Neither do we have relationships, 
such as grants or consulting assignments, with any of 
these organizations. Throughout the report, we offer 
examples from organizations and interventions that we 
consider to illustrate given concepts, sometimes positively 
and other times negatively.
Definitions and Limitations
DEFINITIONS AND LIMITATIONS
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Houston has a very diverse population and is home to people with a broad range of income levels. 
According to the 2016 American Community Survey 
5-year estimates, 29 percent of Houston residents were 
foreign-born. A quarter of the residents were non-His-
panic whites, 22 percent non-Hispanic blacks, 44 percent 
Hispanics and 7 percent Asians. Of languages spoken 
at home, 56 percent were English only, 33 percent were 
Spanish, 5 percent were Asian and Pacific Islander and 
6 percent were other languages. According to a report by 
the Pew Research Center, Houston and its surrounding 
suburbs had the third-largest undocumented immigrant 
population in the country in 2014, totaling 575,000 people, 
about 8.7 percent of the area’s population.22 In 2016, while 
the median household income in Houston was $47,010 (in 
2016 inflation adjusted dollars), 18 percent of Houstonians 
between the ages of 18 and 64 reported living in poverty. 
An estimated 724,750 food insecure individuals live in 
Harris County with a food insecurity rate of 16.6 percent, 
about 4 percentage points above the national average.
These economic issues connect with health issues. In 
2012, Men’s Fitness magazine rated Houston as the 
fattest city in the U.S.23 although another ranking of 
the fattest cities placed it as 53 out of 100 in 2018.24 
According to the Harris County Healthcare Alliance’s 
2015–2016 The State of Health report, about two-
thirds of the area’s adult residents were overweight, 
meaning they had a body mass index above 25, and 
about one-third of the population was considered 
obese, with a body mass index above 30, with varia-
tion across ethnicity. One in three children is likely 
to be obese in Harris County and one in three chil-
dren born since 2000 is likely to develop diabetes.25 
These health challenges result in additional health 
care costs of $3 billion in just Harris County.26 Finally, 
the cost to Texas due to obesity was estimated at 
$10.5 billion in 2001, rising to $39 billion in 2040.27 
Additionally, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, about 
25 percent of Houston’s population did not have health 
insurance in 2016,28 which is double the U.S. national 
average of 12 percent. Houston’s lack of health insurance 
coverage is higher than many other major cities, including 
Chicago (15 percent), Los Angeles (18 percent) and New 
York City (11 percent).
The paucity of grocery stores in many of these communi-
ties reduces easy access to fresh and healthy foods, exac-
erbating these health problems. Over 500,000 Houston 
residents live in USDA-designated food desert areas.29 
Many residents of food desert neighborhoods face trans-
portation challenges such as not having public transpor-
tation or access to private transportation. In some areas 
of Harris County, over 50 percent of the residents report 
travelling over 6 miles to reach the nearest grocery store.30 
In spite of the increased attention to food deserts, of the 20 
grocery stores established in Houston between 2011 and 
2015, only one of them was located in a food desert area.31 
Figure 1a shows food deserts in Houston, Figure 1b shows 
food deserts in Harris County and Figure 1c shows them 
throughout the Greater Houston area.
Food Insecurity in Houston
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FIGURE
FIGURE
FIGURE
1a
1b
1c
Food Desert Map of the City of Houston
Food Desert Map of Harris County
Food Desert Map of the Greater Houston Region
Source: USDA Food Access Research Atlas (2017), Low-income census tracts 
where a significant number or share of residents is more than 1 mile (urban) or 10 
miles (rural) from the nearest supermarket.32
Source: USDA Food Access Research Atlas (2017), Low-income census tracts 
where a significant number or share of residents is more than 1 mile (urban) or 10 
miles (rural) from the nearest supermarket.
Source: USDA Food Access Research Atlas (2017), Low-income census tracts 
where a significant number or share of residents is more than 1 mile (urban) or 10 
miles (rural) from the nearest supermarket.
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Similar to other large cities, such trends have spurred ef-
forts in Houston to address food insecurity through many 
initiatives. Over the past several years, collaborations 
across multiple organizations from different sectors have 
become increasingly prevalent. These include, but are not 
limited to the public financing of private sector grocery 
stores, “healthier corner stores,” nutrition education for 
children in public schools and government and founda-
tion-aided efforts to develop community gardens and 
farmers markets. As such, Houston’s food insecurity and 
food deserts are a rich context to examine the issues sur-
rounding collaborative activity towards solving complex 
societal problems. Table 1 lists some of the organizations 
working on food insecurity in the Greater Houston area.
TABLE 1 List of Organizations with notable work in Houston Food Insecurity Space
Government Nonprofit Service Providers For-Profit Others
Houston Health Department
(various programs)
Houston Food Bank
(distribution)
Pyburns Farm Fresh Foods
(food retail)
Texas Hunger Initiative at 
Baylor University (advocacy)
City of Pasadena Brighter Bites
(education and distribution)
Large Grocers,
e.g., Kroger, H-E-B, Fiesta, 
Walmart, Target (food retail)
Hunger Free Texans 
(advocacy)
Harris County Public Health
(various programs,  
e.g., nutrition education, 
mobile food truck)
Urban Harvest
(education, community 
gardens, farmers markets)
Smaller format grocers,  
e.g., Joe V’s, Aldi
(food retail)
Houston Food Policy  
Working Group (advocacy)
State of Texas
(various programs, e.g., 
support for farmers markets)
Recipe for Success
(education, gardens,  
urban farm)
Corner/Convenience Stores
(food retail) 
Texas Southern University 
Food Desert Mitigation 
Project (garden)
Federal programs
(food assistance, SNAP, WIC)
CAN DO Houston
(healthier corner store)
Finca Tres Robles
(urban farm)
Texas A&M AgriLife  
Extension Master Gardeners 
(garden education)
Community Family Centers
(food pantry)
UnitedHealth Foundation 
(funding)
Target Hunger
(food pantry)
Episcopal Health Foundation
(funding)
Palm Center Community 
Garden(community garden)
The Food Trust
(research and advocacy)
East End Farmers Market
(neighborhood market)
University of Texas School of 
Public Health (research)
Second Servings of Houston 
(food waste)
University of Houston 
Downtown, Center for Urban 
Agriculture & Sustainability 
(research)
Clinton Foundation (research)
Rice University (research)
American Heart Association 
(advocacy)
Memorial Hermann 
Community Benefit 
Corporation  
(funding and advocacy)
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Unsurprisingly, given the size of the food insecurity problem in Houston, we see many collaborations. 
The collaborations involve many different types of 
organizations, including nonprofit organizations, busi-
nesses, governmental agencies, schools and universities 
and funders. Most of these collaborations involve narrow 
relationships that focus on delivering and implementing a 
single intervention. We also find that some collaborations 
are broader involving multiple organizations. Overall, 
we observe four types of such collaborations: dominant 
player supply chain, neighborhood wrap-around, umbrel-
la food systems services and information collaborators. 
These collaborations varied considerably in their goals, 
activities, scope, attention to users, incentives and scale 
potential that another article more fully describes.33 Even 
these broader collaborations are narrow in their scope 
and impact, addressing only a slice of the problem. Here, 
we briefly introduce each type of collaboration.
Dominant Player Supply Chain 
Collaboration
The dominant organization in hunger relief in the Greater 
Houston area is the Houston Food Bank (HFB). HFB 
is widely known within and outside of Houston. HFB 
received the Food Bank of the Year award in 2015. As 
the largest food bank in America, HFB reaches 800,000 
people in 18 counties34 throughout Texas and delivers over 
$100 million worth of food. HFB’s primary role is to act 
as a food distributor. It procures food from farmers and 
vendors such as Sysco as well as the Feeding America 
program. Then HFB operates as a distribution hub to 
over 600 organizations, mostly food pantries operated by 
nonprofit organizations and churches, that serve as “the 
last mile” in bringing food to those in need.
In addition, HFB leverages its position to collaborate with 
many other nonprofit organizations, such as Brighter 
Bites,35 to pursue demand-side initiatives. Brighter Bites 
has collaborated with the CATCH Global Foundation to 
develop nutrition education for elementary-aged children 
enrolled in low-income schools. Through the program, 
these children learn about nutritious and delicious dishes 
using fresh fruits and vegetables, have a “fun food tasting 
experience” with their parents and take home about 20 
pounds of fresh fruits and vegetables per week during 
the eight weeks, or each semester, of the course. Brighter 
Bites began in Houston in one school in 2012 and now 
reaches over 45 schools in Houston, 10 in Austin, 20 in 
Dallas, as well as new sites in New York City, Washington, 
D.C. and southwestern Florida.
In Houston, HFB and Brighter Bites are engaged in what 
we call a dominant player supply chain collaboration. 
HFB’s relationships with many vendors allow it to pro-
cure and supply a variety of healthy foods for Brighter 
Bites’ program. HFB’s expertise in sourcing and distrib-
uting allows Brighter Bites to have consistent access to 
high quality foods for their students and their families. 
In dominant player supply chain collaborations, partners 
share a common agenda and have a self-reinforcing rela-
tionship. The downsides are that the scope is narrow and 
users falling outside the bounds of the collaboration are 
left unserved.
Collaborations We Observed
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The Neighborhood Wrap-Around 
Collaboration
The neighborhood wrap-around collaboration centers on 
local food pantries. It concentrates on the persons who 
visit or otherwise access pantries to receive their food. In 
this model, when a client comes to the pantry for food, the 
pantry’s staff additionally tries to assess whether that per-
son needs other services, such as transportation, housing 
or health services. The pantry staff dials into these many 
needs and regularly connects clients to such services.
The neighborhood wrap-around collaboration provides 
high attention to clients. We know of at least two food 
pantries, Target Hunger and Community Family Centers, 
using this model. Each has directors keenly attuned to 
users’ needs and has a trusting relationship with them. 
Another strength is its broad scope: the users’ needs are 
not limited to their immediate food need but instead ex-
tend to their underlying problems leading to such needs. 
From a user’s perspective, such personalized attention 
increases the probability of successful interventions. 
The disadvantages of this type of collaboration include a 
lack of a common agenda across collaborators, failure to 
self-reinforce (for example, the transportation services or-
ganization does not do better or worse if the client access-
es pantry services) and a somewhat limited scale, often 
just the neighborhood served by such organizations.
Umbrella Collaboration
Another effort in Houston’s food insecurity space is 
a multi-organization collaboration such as the Harris 
County Build Health Partnership (Harris County BUILD 
Health Partnership, 2017) that operated from June 2015 
until June 2017. Using a $250,000 grant from the national 
program, BUILD Health Challenge, the Harris County 
BUILD Health Partnership worked with sponsoring 
organizations to improve the entire food system within 
Pasadena, with particular emphasis on increasing access 
to quality foods such as fresh produce for lower-income 
residents. This effort encompassed initiatives for local 
food production, like supporting a vertical farm and 
capacity building for future farmers; food distribution, 
including a healthier foods corner stores initiative and 
consumption, with a local health center referring food 
insecure patients to a local food pantry.
We call this type of arrangement an umbrella col-
laboration. Under the umbrella, the lead organizers, 
Harris County Public Health, the City of Pasadena, 
The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, 
University of Texas Health and the HFB, identified and 
recruited organizations to deliver many of these services. 
Some of the organizations were involved in Healthy Living 
Matters,36 an earlier and ongoing collaboration to curb 
childhood obesity. The advantage of the umbrella is that 
the scope is wide: the entire food system in the commu-
nity is considered. Because the lead organizers attempted 
to recruit key service providers, the scale is also large, en-
compassing Pasadena. However, umbrella organizations 
are difficult to hold together. Some of the services-provid-
ing organizations may not share the collective goals of the 
leadership. Incentives may be misaligned. For example, a 
service provider of food prescriptions is not aligned with 
the local food production or corner stores components. 
Finally, umbrella organizations may not fully attend to us-
ers’ needs. Umbrellas tend to be top 
down, treating users as beneficiaries, 
instead of bottom up where users 
have more personal agency.
Information Collaborators
A final class of collaboration in the 
food insecurity space is in the infor-
mation—not services delivery—area. 
Several organizations act to gather 
and disseminate information to oth-
ers. Such information assists other 
organizations to learn about pro-
grams, potential sources of funding 
and support, as well as better ways 
to access and serve users. These 
informational collaborators also 
COLLABORATIONS WE OBSERVED
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provide information to governmen-
tal actors (elected officials and their 
staffs and agency personnel), the 
media and the public.
One such organization is the Texas 
Hunger Initiative, affiliated with 
Baylor University. The Texas Hunger 
Initiative conducts research to deter-
mine the effectiveness of various an-
ti-hunger programs. It also supports, 
advocates for and provides resources 
to various organizations in the food 
insecurity space.37 We observed 
Texas Hunger Initiative as brokers 
of information and best practices to 
several organizations that lack the in-
ternal capacity to analyze certain ac-
tivities. Texas Hunger Initiative also 
connects such organizations to other 
organizations, such as service-deliv-
erers to funders and to governmental 
agencies. As is evident, information 
collaborators do not provide direct 
services on their own.
In summary, with the exception of 
the now-defunct umbrella collabo-
ration in Pasadena (of which certain 
parts have been absorbed into the 
existing Pasadena Health Living 
Matters and Pasadena Vibrant 
Communities programs), none of 
these collaborations encompasses 
the entirety of the social problem. 
This is not to diminish these col-
laborations, as within the spheres 
they define, many of them deliver 
positive social outcomes. For exam-
ple, in the vast majority of Brighter 
Bites’ schools, the families report positive outcomes after 
the intervention.38 In many of the wrap-around services 
collaborations, users have positive experiences. Still, 
none of these are as comprehensive as the efforts un-
dertaken in systemic collaborations like that in Finland. 
There, most organizations were unified and consistently 
practiced activities that in sum produced impressive 
social outcomes.39 In contrast, the lack of unity across the 
collaborations and subsequent gaps in service puzzled us, 
given the apparent severity of the food insecurity prob-
lem in Houston. Thus, we were compelled to dissect the 
two elements of social problem identification: problem 
ambiguity and user ambiguity, to more readily under-
stand the kind of observed collaborations and where 
systemic collaborations would stand. Further, we sought 
to understand the barriers to the emergence of systemic 
collaboration and identified how institutional barriers 
and mindsets of organizational competition influence the 
nature of collaborations in this space.
COLLABORATIONS WE OBSERVED
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From the data collected, we built a general model about systemic collaboration.40 The model features two lead-
ing forces that together generate the latent conditions that 
might both facilitate systemic collaboration and encourage 
fragmented discrete collaborations. These forces emerge 
from how organizations and individuals define the social 
problem and have two parts: problem ambiguity about 
the social issue and user ambiguity about those involved 
in the social problem. We describe each of these in turn.
Problem Ambiguity
We found that problem ambiguity about food insecuri-
ty leads to significant fragmentation of meaning across 
organizations. We explain three components of problem 
ambiguity: definitional ambiguity, scope ambiguity and 
goal ambiguity.
Definitional ambiguity
We found significant ambiguity as to how respondents 
define the problem. We observed a range of problem 
characterizations that extended from outright doubt as to 
whether Houston, for example, has a food insecurity (or 
food deserts) problem at all to deep convictions that food 
insecurity is a grave problem negatively affecting individ-
ual and community well-being.
Some skeptics saw food deserts as an artifact of the mea-
sures used to define it. As they pointed out, changing the 
distance criterion (such as to 2 miles; the USDA defini-
tions are 1 mile and 0.5 miles in urban areas) between 
neighborhoods and grocery stores negates the existence 
of many food deserts. Others argued that broad changes 
in family life such as less emphasis on the familial and 
cultural aspects of home-cooked meals contribute more to 
poor dietary habits associated with food-related chronic 
diseases than the lack of grocery stores in a neighborhood.
Among those viewing food insecurity or deserts as a 
grave social problem, respondents differed as to whether 
it was a supply-side issue or a demand-side issue. The 
USDA’s definition of food desert, as shown earlier, frames 
food deserts as a supply problem related to people living 
in low-income neighborhoods without reasonable access 
to supermarkets. Organizations defining food deserts 
as a supply problem sought to increase the supply of 
fresh food in the community by supporting initiatives 
aiming to start more community gardens, form farm-
ers markets, subsidize new grocery stores and re-make 
convenience stores into healthy venues that sell fresh 
fruits and vegetables. Other organizations defined food 
deserts as a demand-related problem—generally, low 
demand for fruits and vegetables in many low-income 
neighborhoods provided little incentive for organizations 
to supply such foods in these markets. Such framing 
coincided with many of the Houston Food Bank’s Food 
for Change41 collaborations. For example, the Food for 
Change program supports demand-oriented programs by 
offering food scholarships for healthy food to community 
college students who remain enrolled and food prescrip-
tions for healthy food to community members screened 
in health clinics as food insecure and at risk for or pre-
viously diagnosed with various health maladies. Other 
demand-oriented initiatives focus upon teaching food, 
gardening, nutrition and related knowledge to children, 
such as the programs offered by Brighter Bites and Recipe 
for Success. As one informant told us, “Our focus is on 
providing the tools necessary for individuals to make 
informed choices [when they select foods],” which is nec-
essary to stimulate demand in the community.
Scope Ambiguity
We also found scope ambiguity about food insecurity and 
food deserts. Scope ambiguity affects the boundaries of 
the social problem. As boundaries expand, more organi-
zations and stakeholders from different sector agencies 
gain an interest in the problem; as boundaries narrow, 
fewer organizations typically exhibit interest in it.
Emergent Model of Systemic 
Collaboration
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Some respondents viewed food deserts as a symptom of 
deeper underlying social problems. For instance, some 
respondents saw the paucity of grocery stores in low-in-
come neighborhoods as evidence of racial discrimination 
and social injustice. They believed some options, such as 
grocery stores and farmers markets, available in priv-
ileged neighborhoods are systematically denied to less 
well-off ones. Framing food deserts in terms of racial or 
social injustice influences the interpretations of certain 
interventions. For example, some politicians and local 
community leaders who had pushed for H-E-B to open 
up a conventional grocery store in a low-income neigh-
borhood were quite hostile to the possibility that H-E-B 
instead intended to open Joe V’s, one of its smaller format 
stores. They saw it as a slight to the neighborhood (note: 
the store was not built). Others view the food desert prob-
lem as a symptom of the lack of economic development in 
the neighborhood. Therefore, any new supermarket had 
to include other elements of economic development, such 
as the development of other local businesses and local 
jobs, which could raise local employment and incomes. 
Other informants saw food deserts as a failure of urban 
planning, pointing to a lack of walkable neighborhoods 
and public spaces as well as insufficient public transit as 
barriers for residents to access supermarkets and oth-
er fresh food sources within their neighborhoods. For 
instance, some of the community development organi-
zations like the Greater East End Management District 
advocated for better public transportation, repairing or 
demolishing abandoned houses, fixing sidewalks, putting 
in street lights, policing and other such aspects as key 
components of improving the access to healthy foods in 
the neighborhood.
Goal Ambiguity
Ambiguity also existed as to whether goals should be 
set at the individual or community level. Thus, while a 
goal of establishing a grocery store in a food desert may 
fulfill community-level goals of bringing such food supply 
into the neighborhood, if the store is not heavily visited 
by those living in the neighborhood it may fail to affect 
healthier food consumption at the individual level. For 
example, in our focus groups with residents of the OST/
South Union neighborhood held in February 2017, we 
discovered that most participants did not know about or 
shop at Pyburns Farm Fresh Foods, the subsidized gro-
cery store advocated for by the Houston Grocery Access 
Task Force and brought into the neighborhood in 2015 
during Mayor Annise Parker’s administration. Instead, 
many said they preferred other grocery stores.
Goals also differed as to timeframes. Some organizations 
developed interventions for proximate goals while others 
pursued distant goals. Proximate goals focused on getting 
users to do something immediately, such as visiting a 
farmers market or participating in a gardening education 
program this week, this month, this semester, etc. Distant 
goals focused on producing behaviors that might take lon-
ger to achieve positive outcomes. Examples include some 
of the healthier diet initiatives that might minimize the 
risks of obesity, diabetes and other maladies if followed 
for a significant amount of time. Food prescriptions, 
for example, yield a small but sustained positive effect 
by increasing fruit and vegetable intake, decreasing fat 
intake and decreasing dietary cholesterol intake per day.42 
Despite the relatively small effect sizes, these interven-
tions could be quite impactful if practiced over an extend-
ed period because they create healthy habits for users. 
Thus, ambiguity in the timeframe of an intervention could 
cause organizations to abandon interventions that do not 
yield immediate results, despite their overall effectiveness.
User Ambiguity
We identify two aspects of users that lead to ambiguity 
about their association with the social problem. The first is 
what we call user roles. Interventions varied in terms of as-
sumptions of user roles. Some interventions required users 
to be active participants while others commanded a more 
passive role. Likewise, some interventions placed consid-
erable time demands upon users while others did not. The 
second aspect is what we call user heterogeneity. This con-
cept is about the range of users and diversity of user needs 
that influence the necessity for different interventions.
Ambiguity about Users’ Roles towards the Social 
Problem: Effort and Time
Some interventions require relatively small changes in 
user behavior. For example, proponents of new food 
sources in food desert neighborhoods, such as opening a 
supermarket, bringing fresh fruits and vegetables into a 
local corner store, driving a produce truck into the neigh-
borhood or establishing a farmers market, believe that 
only the unavailability of healthy foods prevents users 
from eating it. Going beyond mere availability, such inter-
ventions may also involve guiding customers through a 
store towards healthy foods by designing grocery store 
layouts, color schemes and aisle displays in ways that 
make healthy food selections perhaps even subconscious, 
as demonstrated in a convenience store “bodega” project 
in Los Angeles, California.43 However, improving infra-
structure in a food desert (e.g., by inserting a grocery 
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store) does not seem to ensure any measurable changes. 
Although residents perceived food to be more accessible 
after a new grocery store opened in a Philadelphia food 
desert, no changes occurred in the residents’ intake of 
fruits and vegetables or body mass index.44 In contrast, 
other interventions require users to undertake signifi-
cant behavioral efforts. For example, the students par-
ticipating in the Brighter Bites’ intervention study the 
nutrition curriculum for two eight-week sessions per 
academic year and parents or guardians are required to 
be at school for produce delivery. Other food insecurity 
interventions probe broader causes such as lack of em-
ployment or low wage employment that require users to 
engage intensively in job training, interviewing skills and 
resume writing programs.
We found that the length of the 
interaction with the user is anoth-
er critical component that varies 
across interventions. Specifically, 
how much time is the user required 
to change his or her behaviors that 
would solve the social problem? 
Here again, interventions, such as 
placing more nutritious foods near 
users perhaps by introducing new 
grocery stores or farmers markets 
into the neighborhood assume that 
users need little time to change their 
shopping and eating habits if only 
presented with healthier selections. 
In contrast, many of the demand-side 
interventions such as the aforemen-
tioned nutrition and food preparation 
skills curricula and job skills training 
require the user to have sustained 
interaction over a longer period to 
achieve desired outcomes. A recent 
systematic review found that nutri-
tion education interventions lasting 
at least five months were more effec-
tive at meeting their stated nutrition-
al goals than those lasting less than 
five months.45 For instance, Recipe 
for Success, a nonprofit organization, 
developed a year-long curriculum 
educating elementary and middle 
school children in public schools on 
gardening and culinary skills with 
the hope of inculcating healthier 
eating habits. However, the extent 
to which these semester or year-long 
programs could create the behavioral changes necessary 
for observing changes in community-level health metrics 
remains an empirical question.
User Heterogeneity
Finally, we found a significant role for user heterogeneity. 
Our interviews revealed a composite picture of a context 
where different interventions were targeting different 
types of users. For instance, Brighter Bites has a relatively 
focused target: generally targeting low-income house-
holds with young children reached through the public 
school system. Other interventions target local residents 
with certain conditions beyond their immediate need for 
healthy food. For example, some of the infrastructure 
programs such as sidewalks and street lighting focused 
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upon individuals who might access food sources on foot, 
such as senior citizens or low-income citizens who may 
not have access to automobiles. Some of the community 
gardens and farmers markets focused upon long-term 
residents, “the neighbors,” to create a sense of community 
pride. Our two focus groups provided further evidence 
for user heterogeneity: we found significant differences 
in automobile access, concerns of homeowners (espe-
cially long-time residents) from more-transient renters, 
age and family structure, among others, affecting views 
about the neighborhood, food, shopping, cooking and 
eating. We also discover that users were heterogeneous 
based on their range of needs. For instance, single par-
ent-families may have multiple needs related to income, 
time available for shopping and cooking that differ from 
two-parent households, all of which have consequences 
for the family’s relationship with healthy food and health. 
Interventions that account for such heterogeneity are 
more likely to be successful than those that do not.
Problem Identification Suggests Certain 
Types of Collaborations
We believe that problem ambiguity and user ambiguity 
combine to produce pressure toward certain types of 
collaborations. We suggest that organizations differ on 
the extent to which they recognize ambiguity and design 
interventions that address the multiple sources of ambi-
guity. In addition, organizations vary in their emphasis 
on problem ambiguity and user ambiguity. For example, 
some collaborations emphasize the ambiguity of the prob-
lem and potential solutions. A great example is Brighter 
Bites working on improving the diets and nutritional 
literacy of their children and families. Brighter Bites rec-
ognized that the problem is complex and devoted signif-
icant attention to a robust solution. Thus, Brighter Bites 
teamed with many partners, each with specialized scope 
and skills. For example, they collaborate with food pro-
viders, with schools and school principals to find appro-
priate sites, with parents to get the volunteers needed to 
package the food, with the CATCH Global Foundation to 
create a curriculum that could be taught in public schools 
and with the University of Texas School of Public Health 
to design metrics and analyze the data. Brighter Bites’ 
collection of these partners shows that they recognize suc-
cessful solutions involve inclusion of many facets of the 
problem instead of just “plunking down” an intervention 
without attention to its complexity.
The emphasis on user ambiguity is another point of 
differentiation across collaborations. Some collaborations 
recognize the heterogeneous roles and needs of users. 
Community Family Centers is an example of collabora-
tions emphasizing the variety of users’ roles and needs. 
For example, besides the immediate need for food, a 
particular user (perhaps a senior) might have government 
benefits needs, whereas a non-senior adult may have 
childcare needs, whereas another young adult may have 
education needs. Initiatives that intervene in the built en-
vironment (e.g., transportation systems) may complement 
other health-related initiatives, such as adding targeted 
grocery stores to the neighborhood. The quality of the 
infrastructure influences the user’s perceptions of active 
transportation and likelihood that the community will be 
active.46 These sorts of collaborations home in on those 
variegated roles and needs and try to locate partners that 
can fulfill such needs.
In creating this “2x2” matrix, depicted 
in Table 2, we are not suggesting that 
organizations are incapable of emphasiz-
ing both of these aspects. For example, 
Brighter Bites recognizes that the after-
school “touchpoint” does not reach all of 
its students and thus have begun experi-
menting with other forms of distribution. 
However, considering children and their 
families more homogenously is what 
makes the program scalable. Likewise, 
it is not to suggest that wrap-around 
services collaborations never consider 
the complexity of the social problem. 
However, they most emphasize servicing 
their heterogeneous users in the areas 
where they need social services.
EMERGENT MODEL OF SYSTEMIC COLLABORATION
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What is missing in our matrix is the “high-high” cate-
gory that we label systemic collaboration. We did not 
see any systemic collaborations in the Houston food 
insecurity space. If it had lasted for more than two years 
(more below), we may have offered Pasadena’s BUILD 
Health Alliance as an example in this cell. However, as 
of August 2018, this alliance is discontinued, although 
some parts remain. High problem ambiguity and user 
ambiguity reflect the interdependence between the 
different facets of the problem and the needs of the 
users. Addressing the problem successfully requires a 
systemic approach that addresses these different facets 
simultaneously. Thus, addressing food insecurity and 
food deserts may require addressing multiple factors 
such as economic development, infrastructure, ensuring 
multiple supply sources of healthy foods while simul-
taneously providing individuals and families, skill and 
knowledge to make healthy food choices. In addition, 
addressing the problem in such contexts also requires 
tailoring the multiple interventions to different needs 
of target demographics. As our Figure 2 shows, initia-
tives that emphasize high problem ambiguity and high 
user ambiguity necessitate the need for the formation of 
systemic collaborations involving multiple organizations 
and entities. However, high problem ambiguity and high 
user ambiguity also provide the conditions for organi-
zations to tailor their interventions and collaborations 
narrowly by discretely defining problems or identifying 
some users and their needs. Many of the collaborations 
that we observed in this space seem to represent that re-
ality. The question is why is it so hard to observe collab-
orations falling into the “high-high” cell. We argue in the 
next section that significant barriers exist against such 
systemic collaborations.
FIGURE 2 Factors enabling systemic collaborations
TABLE 2 The relationship between problem ambiguity emphasis and user ambiguity 
emphasis on collaboration type
Problem Ambiguity Emphasis
Low High
User
Ambiguity
Emphasis
Low
Transactions,
e.g., users of SNAP in grocery stores & 
urban farmers markets
Dominant Supply Chain 
Collaborations,
e.g., HFB & Brighter Bites
High
Neighborhood wrap-around 
collaboration;
e.g., Community Family Centers & local 
social services partners
Systemic collaboration
Problem 
Ambiguity
User  
Ambiguity
SYSTEMIC  
COLLABORATION 
NECESSITATED
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Pressures Against Systemic Collaborations
Our fieldwork also revealed many pressures that hinder 
the emergence of systemic collaborations. Some of these 
pressures come from what we call institutional barriers, 
consisting of funders, public policies and politics. These 
pressures might be seen as external to each organization. 
The second set of pressures comes from what we call a 
mindset of competition. The source for this set is internal 
and is prevalent in both businesses and nonprofit organi-
zations. We describe each of these pressures in turn.
Institutional Barriers
Funders
Many of our informants mentioned three aspects of 
funding that hinder systemic collaboration. First, funding 
typically flows to programs that can be scaled rapidly, 
because rapid scale means more users are served which 
drives collective impact.47 Scalability also links closely to 
a focus on metrics that are easily measured. Not surpris-
ingly, this leads organizations to focus on interventions 
that provide quick metrics on the services delivery side 
(for example, more meals served each year; more children 
who participate in a food or gardening curriculum; more 
pounds of food given). Services are easiest to deliver and 
scale when users are homogeneous or at least considered 
to be homogeneous in terms of their roles and characteris-
tics. Thus, it is easiest to gain scale when considering one 
type of user, say school-aged children, or one type of user 
role, say his or her “at premises” shopping decision, than 
to have a range of users. Thus, we see funding prioritizes 
narrow sets of user roles and characteristics.
Second, funders preferred supporting evidence-based in-
terventions where impacts can be measured. Government 
funders were the subset of funders most focused on data 
and results. The focus on evidence-based intervention 
leads to tightly targeted parameters that provide little 
flexibility for deviations and experimentation. A good 
example of this is the Houston Food Bank’s partnership 
with Brighter Bites and elementary schools where each 
partner has a specified role and the program is intention-
ally standardized for children (and their families) meeting 
the selection criteria. Interventions not meeting such 
criteria are excluded. The pressure to show evidence also 
influences organizations to pursue projects where posi-
tive outcomes can be attributed to themselves and not to 
other organizations as in a collaboration. This might lead 
to a preference for solo projects, or when collaboration 
is necessary, developing relationships where the param-
eters of engagement can be clearly defined. Not surpris-
ingly, many such collaborations are operationally-driven 
where evidence is seemingly straightforward such as how 
many pounds of food were delivered and received. In our 
fieldwork, we also see nonprofit organizations attempting 
to demonstrate “success” based on such evidence rather 
than more indirect and distant measures that actually 
track users and the potential benefits to the users aris-
ing out of such interventions. For example, the evidence 
of successful performance of the Healthy Corner Store 
Network in Pasadena presented by CAN DO Houston is 
based on the number of stores that stock fresh fruits and 
vegetables as part of this program.48 Whether this pro-
gram has changed the shopping and eating behaviors on a 
sustained basis is not specified.
Third, most funding sources offered short-term time 
horizons such as one or two years to their recipient or-
ganizations even for seemingly complex and intractable 
social problems. While some funding came with possibil-
ities of renewals, short funding cycles create significant 
uncertainty in the planning of interventions. For instance, 
the Harris County BUILD Health Partnership, described 
above, received a grant to create an entire food system 
for a city in just two years. As one respondent noted, the 
funding period was long enough only to understand the 
problem sufficiently, identify metrics and develop a ques-
tionnaire for residents’ needs assessment, but not long 
enough to implement many interventions.
Government Policies
Government policies are another critical factor impeding 
the emergence of systemic collaboration. Government 
plays an outsized role in the food desert problem due to 
its influence across multiple levels (federal, state, city, 
community), investments in programs and mandates 
to individuals and institutions. The federal government 
spent about $68 billion on SNAP funding and about $5.6 
billion on Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program 
in 2017.49 A positive example of what we saw is the ex-
tension of SNAP benefits into many of the Houston-area 
farmers markets so that the recipients could use their 
food benefits in those venues.
However, public policies sometimes worked against 
systemic collaborations. Some public funding for food 
desert initiatives came with tight parameters that brooked 
no deviations. For instance, one informant expressed 
frustration that the City of Houston declined several 
million dollars of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development grants. The informant lamented that city of-
ficials refused to consider projects aimed at building new 
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sidewalks and making safer street 
crossings in a food desert neighbor-
hood as food desert related, even 
though such interventions have been 
associated with better walkability 
and use of neighborhood assets such 
as corner stores.50
Organizations were also constrained 
by public policies that dictated with 
whom and how they can collaborate. 
Several organizations work with 
public schools in implementing some 
of their interventions. Working in 
public schools requires tailoring 
interventions to the school calendar, 
school day and meeting other criteria 
for working with school-aged children. 
The organizations had to make sure that their curricu-
lum met the Coordinated Approach to Childhood Health 
(CATCH) educational requirements set by the Texas 
Education Agency. Changes in district or school policies, 
curriculum and personnel (for instance, when a support-
ive school principal moved) all affected the continuity of 
those interventions.
Regulations also played a role in affecting interventions. 
One informant recounted how policies about proper-
ty taxation instituted by the City of Houston’s Land 
Assemblage Redevelopment Authority and the State of 
Texas affect the feasibility of urban gardens and urban 
farms.51 Ironically, when urban gardens and urban farms 
successfully improve ambience in those neighborhoods, 
the property values rose such that the property taxes 
(taxed at higher rates than rural farms) increased to such 
an extent that it became difficult to continue the project.
Politics
Finally, politics favors interventions with quick, visible 
and locally identifiable impacts. For elected officials, 
election cycles and political terms appear to dictate time-
frames on many projects. A public official recounted that 
a staff member was allowed to pursue a food desert inter-
vention project on the condition that it could be completed 
within the electoral term. Elected officials also preferred 
visible and identifiable projects. Thus, we have witnessed 
many public officials participating in groundbreakings of 
new grocery stores, such as Pyburns Farm Fresh Foods, 
partially subsidized by the City of Houston, as well as 
at openings of several urban gardens and farmers mar-
kets. In March of 2017, Houston City Council voted to use 
public funds to entice H-E-B, a large grocer, to develop 
a property within the city. City Council Member Dwight 
Boykins, who represents the district with the site of the 
new store, stated, “The beauty of this is that you will 
have low-income and high-income people shopping in 
the same store.”52 However, other politicians were more 
reserved, such as Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner, who 
said, “I’m not going to say that I’m jumping up and down 
about it. There are several [other] areas that are literally 
food deserts.”53 Such projects offer visible and delineated 
deliverables for public officials even though many of these 
interventions may not have widespread community sup-
port or demand for the outputs. Electoral cycles also favor 
collaborations with quick payoffs instead of those where 
outcomes may not become visible for many years.
Politics also threatens to contaminate many collabora-
tions with unnecessary “local” elements. As politics is 
local, politicians want interventions in their jurisdictions. 
Thus, they want a garden, a farmers market, a grocery 
store, etc., in their jurisdiction, even if there is one “next 
door” or even if residents regularly travel outside of the 
immediate neighborhood to access food that they prefer.
Mindset of Competition
A second barrier to systemic collaboration was the compe-
tition between organizations for resources, public attention 
and reputation and legitimacy. What was surprising was 
that what we call the mindset of competition is not limited 
to for-profit businesses but extends as well to nonprofit 
organizations and even (to a lesser extent) to governmental 
offices.54 In this section, we concentrate upon the mindset 
of competition as practiced by nonprofit organizations.
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In resource scarce environments, nonprofit organizations 
tailor their interventions to attract resource providers.55 In 
addition, because uncertainty underlies resource acquisi-
tion, nonprofit organizations seek funding from multiple 
sources. Due to the programmatic desires of funders, as 
discussed above, nonprofit organizations must sometimes 
move away from their core capabilities, locations and 
strategies to develop programs able to attract new funds.
Resource scarcity also affects the nature of interventions 
since funding one intervention means fewer resources are 
available for other interventions. There are heated debates 
as to which organizations should receive public subsidies 
for locating grocery stores in a food desert neighborhood, 
with each organization vociferously making its claim. On 
the one hand, some community members viewed large 
grocery chains as the only acceptable option because that 
is where most people shop or at least state that they like 
to shop. For some individuals, even the smaller formats 
of the large chains were considered less than ideal. As a 
former public official noted, “Some of the neighborhoods 
are afraid of bait and switch; when they hear that you will 
get a grocery store, they think H-E-B [a major chain] and 
they end up with something lesser like a Joe V’s.” Others, 
however, questioned whether providing subsidies to large 
chains such as Kroger and H-E-B was wise at all. As one 
respondent countered, “One challenge with the Food 
Trust type of subsidy especially to the big guys [large 
national chains] is that you are giving city money to them 
to compete against little independents.”
The mindset of competition has implications for how 
organizations perceive and work with other organiza-
tions. While in the for-profit context, some organizations 
are defined as competitors in product-market terms, in 
the nonprofit context competitors are often seen as other 
organizations with whom they compete for grants, loans 
and volunteers. This ultimately impedes the sharing of 
knowledge, information, resources and relationships 
across organizations. We see nonprofits using scale as 
well as branding on certain aspects of food insecurity in 
order to gain funding and other external support over 
rival organizations.
In sum, we believe that institutional barriers and the 
mindset of competition combine to weaken and even 
destroy systemic collaboration. Figure 3 illustrates the full 
model. As shown earlier, we believe that as social prob-
lems have higher levels of problem ambiguity and user 
ambiguity they enable the formation of systemic collab-
orations. However, institutional barriers and the mind-
set of competition weaken and even tear apart systemic 
collaborations as we depicted.
FIGURE 3 Model of Systemic Collaborations
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This section offers potential remedies, particularly aimed at offsetting the institutional barriers and the 
mindset of competition that we revealed in the prior sec-
tion. We base these remedies on the data we collected as 
well as inferences we make beyond such data. Our reme-
dies relate to funders, governments, a mindset of altruism 
and backbone organizations.
Funders
As described above, the ways that funders operate often 
can impede systemic collaborations. Funders tend to pre-
fer investing in services interventions with visible “out-
comes” that manifest in the short-run and that are tied 
to a single organization. Less preferred are investments 
encouraging collaborations, capacity building, support 
and infrastructure that can drive longer-term programs 
that tap into multiple organizations.
Following this logic, we suggest several things for 
funders. The first is that funders should be willing to 
invest more in capacity building efforts. Many of the 
organizations, particularly smaller ones, do not have the 
resources for scanning, communicating, measuring and 
reporting outcomes (more on this below). We are pleased 
to see that capacity building funding is beginning to occur 
more regularly.
Second, funders need to move against measuring short-
term programmatic outputs, such as the number of meals 
served by a particular pantry during a day or the number 
of students who participated in a curriculum taught by a 
particular NPO, and particularly against giving or with-
holding funding based upon those metrics. That would 
require moving away from measuring outputs to evaluat-
ing outcomes.
In addition, funders need to recognize multiple organi-
zations in the social problem, paying particular attention 
to some of the supporting or connecting services. This 
means that funders should require their recipients report 
activities across multiple dimensions, including how they 
contribute to other organizations and what they receive 
from other organizations outside of their own programs. 
What this suggests is that organizational evaluations 
shift towards behavioral metrics from simple outcome 
metrics. All of this necessitates thoughtful and scientif-
ically based models about the outcomes of the interven-
tion within the existing social context.56 It also requires 
funders to think broadly about the inter-connectedness 
of different interventions. Without being self-serving, 
this means that funders should support and require 
research efforts similar to how we conducted this study 
to accompany any commitment of resources towards any 
specific intervention.
Governments
On the policy side, we would advocate making policies 
as flexible as possible to support systemic collaborations. 
As public policies often raise the costs of doing business, 
we would encourage governments at all levels to contem-
plate ways of decreasing their fees and regulations, where 
reasonable (e.g., public safety should not be sacrificed), 
such that certain food insecurity goals might be reached. 
For example, we had informants representing small farm-
ers markets tell us that rules and fees related to getting 
a farmers market permit, roadside signage and other 
matters made it exceedingly difficult to run such events 
sustainably. If combatting food insecurity is a community 
priority, governments need to set policies to encourage 
(not discourage) such activities.
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Mindset of Altruism and 
Civic Consciousness
In the private sector, managers of 
businesses sometimes adopt several 
approaches to food insecurity that 
are inspired, in part, by altruism. At 
the more modest level, business firms 
might support some of these collab-
orative efforts through their “social 
responsibility” or “corporate social 
responsibility” (CSR) programs. 
For example, most of the large-scale 
grocers in Houston such as Kroger, 
H-E-B and Fiesta, regularly cull their 
stores’ shelves for nearly expired and 
otherwise unsaleable foods and make 
these available on the back dock for 
pickup by local food pantries. A host 
of food companies, including Calavo 
and Buena Foods,57 donate fresh 
produce to Brighter Bites to support 
its school-based nutritional program-
ming. More ambitiously, private sector retailers might 
come up with alternative business models to make money 
in food deserts and otherwise food insecure areas. Some 
examples include new formats like H-E-B’s Joe V’s stores, 
which allow it to serve lower-income areas but make the 
internal margin requirements. Aldi has also entered into 
some lower-income neighborhoods, as was the case with 
its store on OST near Scott Street. Fiesta has traditionally 
served many of these neighborhoods as well. Finally, we 
have seen attempts at cross-subsidization models. For 
example, Finca Tres Robles, an urban farm in the Second 
Ward, sells bundles of fresh vegetables to subscribers at 
high margins to support donations of bundles to low-in-
come neighbors of the farm.
We argued above that many leaders of non-profit organi-
zations utilize the mindset of competition in running their 
organizations. This leads many to engage in branding 
and scale to dominate competition, among other compet-
itive practices. However, we do not see it as apparent that 
nonprofit organizations need to adopt the competition 
logic over other mindsets, such as altruism and civic con-
sciousness. If the goal is to address the problem of food 
insecurity for instance, it should not matter which orga-
nization does this or receives credit for it. We encourage 
nonprofit organizations to share more of their knowledge 
and to create and adopt user-focused collaborations with 
other organizations.
Backbones
A popular solution to the proliferation of programs across 
multiple organizations in many social areas is to have one 
organization as the coordinator. This coordinating orga-
nization is called the backbone.58 A backbone is a separate 
organization and staff with a very specific set of skills to 
serve as the coordinator, not a deliverer of services, for 
large-scale social initiatives.
In our study, we do not see a backbone organization dedi-
cated to food insecurity in Houston. Some other cities have 
food insecurity related backbones including Cincinnati, 
Ohio and Omaha, Nebraska. 59,60 However, in Houston, 
backbones exist in other social areas such as Houston 
Immigration Legal Services Collaborative, Good Reason 
Houston, Arts Access Collaborative, Harris County Civic 
Engagement Initiative, One Breath Partnership, Dual 
Status Youth Initiative and Combined Arms. Given the 
mindset of competition and institutional barriers, our 
study suggests that the emergence of systemic collabora-
tion may need a catalytic organization, like a backbone. 
More significantly, our study implies that such a back-
bone organization should ideally be a foundation and/or 
government body, or perhaps an information collaborator, 
given the significant barriers to systemic collaboration 
that we described for most nonprofit organizations.
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From our investigation of the organizations participating in Houston’s food insecurity and food deserts space, we conclude that systemic collaboration 
is not present although many other types of collaborations exist. Furthermore, 
although we identify forces pushing organizations towards systemic collaborations, 
we also identify significant barriers to such collaborations emanating from 
institutional barriers and mindsets of competition. Finally, we identify some 
countervailing forces aimed at reducing the barriers against systemic collaborations.
We identified four types of collaborations in the Houston 
food insecurity space. First, we found several dominant 
player supply chain collaborations. These would include 
all of the HFB’s relationships with vendors as well as 
pantries, plus several of their Food for Change partners. 
Second, we observed several neighborhood wrap-around 
collaborations. Those collaborations focus upon users 
who frequent a food pantry and require a dedicated direc-
tor and staff to assess the holistic needs of their clients and 
to connect them to other social services. Third, we saw 
one umbrella collaboration, currently defunct, although 
portions of it continue to operate discretely. The umbrella 
is closest to a systemic collaboration of all collaborations 
observed. Finally, we identified a handful of informational 
collaborators. These organizations collected and dis-
seminated information about users, programs, funders, 
events, public policies, etc. to many stakeholders. Two 
informational collaborators also tried to convene period-
ically many of the services providers. However, none of 
these collaborations approximated the systemic collabora-
tion seen, for example, in Finland where a variegated set 
of organizations rallied in unison over an extended period 
to solve an important social issue in their community.
As such, our qualitative data collection and analyses 
focused upon the forces in Houston pushing or deterring 
organizations from working together toward systemic 
collaborations. As described above, we identify two forces 
that propel organizations toward systemic collaboration: 
problem ambiguity and user ambiguity. Problem ambigu-
ity is the variance around the meaning of the food inse-
curity problem. Some ambiguity stems from definitional 
ambiguity. Some organizations view food insecurity as a 
problem of social injustice (e.g., “haves and have-nots” in 
our community), while others defined it as nutrition, eco-
nomic development, culinary skills, lifestyle, etc. Problem 
ambiguity also is about the scope of the problem. Is it 
connecting a person with reasonable access to fresh fruits 
and vegetables, such as making such foods available near 
to the user (if they were not near previously) or address-
ing many of the reasons that underlie why that person 
lacks such reasonable access? For the former scope, 
organizations may promote solutions such as locating a 
grocery store in a food desert neighborhood or providing 
and/or subsidizing transport of that person to a grocery 
store with such foods. For the latter scope, it might mean 
providing job training to that person so that they have the 
skills to raise their income that might allow them to access 
fresh fruits and vegetables in a number of ways or teach-
ing users about nutrition and cooking that might change 
the demand patterns of grocery shoppers. Finally, we 
encountered goal ambiguity. Some organizations focused 
upon goals for a neighborhood (such as opening a farmers 
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market in food desert neighborhoods) whereas others 
focused on individuals (e.g., improved health measures). 
We propose that as problems assume disparate meanings, 
wide scope and multiple goals, a wider range of organi-
zations will need to be involved that lay the groundwork 
towards systemic collaboration.
Conceptions about users also were a force towards sys-
temic collaborations. We identified two dimensions driv-
ing user ambiguity—ambiguity about the user role and 
user heterogeneity - that may push organizations towards 
systemic collaborations. First, while some interventions 
require little additional efforts from their users, such as 
simply selecting a healthier food at the store where they 
regularly shop, other interventions require that users do 
many activities like attend classes, prepare foods differ-
ently at home, alter lifestyles, etc. Second, some inter-
ventions require that users engage for a short amount of 
time, make a selection of produce at the store at which 
the user shops at the time in which he or she is shopping, 
while others require users to invest a long time with the 
intervention, as is the case for many of the educational 
and gardening initiatives. Finally, some interventions are 
targeted at a relatively homogenous set of users, such as 
elementary-aged students in low-income schools within 
a certain school district, while others have a wide range 
of users, like at a pantry that serves low-income seniors, 
adults with small children, homeless individuals and 
families, etc. We argue that as the user requirements ex-
pand in magnitude and time and as the user heterogeneity 
increases, organizations have incentives to seek a variety 
of partners leading toward systemic collaborations.
Less optimistically, we identify two sets of formidable 
barriers to systemic collaborations. The first, institutional 
barriers, consists of funders, government policies and 
politics. Funders act to retard systemic collaborations 
by preferring to fund direct services offered by a given 
organization or narrow set of organizations over other 
investments such as capacity building. Funders also tend 
to have short funding cycles, as we saw in Pasadena with 
the two-year cycle to rebuild the entire food system. These 
combine to limit the amount of inter-organizational activ-
ities, especially those aimed at organization, advocacy and 
capacity building. Public policies also constrained some 
systemic collaborations. Policies generally have specific 
purposes with limited flexibility. Yet systemic collabora-
tions sometimes require organizations, including gov-
ernmental entities, to be flexible in supporting not only 
the specified program but elements around the program 
(how can a user access it?). Finally, politics sometimes 
gets in the way. Elected officials typically crave vivid and 
newsworthy projects to show constituents that they are 
addressing a social problem. Thus, we see that politicians 
have tended to support new stores, new gardens and 
new farmers markets in their jurisdictions, regardless 
of whether such interventions effectively solve the food 
insecurity problem.
A second institutional barrier is the mindset of competi-
tion that permeates many of the organizations operating 
in food insecurity. As professors in Rice University’s Jones 
Graduate School of Business, we are familiar considering 
this mindset in regard to for-profit businesses. What we 
found surprising was how this mindset also dominates 
many of the nonprofit organizations in this space. Some 
of the competition mindset arises from resource scarcity. 
All of the organization types in the food insecurity space 
need strategies to manage the uncertainty about securing 
resources. As such, they compete to “own” space within 
the larger food insecurity problem, a branding strategy 
per se. While some of this ownership may follow their 
competence in the area, other ownership may crowd out 
resources to other organizations that also could effective-
ly serve such constituencies. We also see organizations 
using scale to push out competitors as well as diversifying 
into areas where they do not necessarily have any exper-
tise or synergy with their existing organization. Finally, 
we see organizations pursuing strategies that yield 
discrete and measurable outcomes that can be claimed by 
themselves that they will use as evidence of their success. 
As we saw with funders above, organizations offer such 
evidence to secure more funds. Thus, a feedback loop 
between the mindset of competition and funders rewards 
narrow interventions over broad, systemic collaborations.
There appears to be no easy way out. We suggest four pos-
sible remedies related to funders, governments, a mindset 
of altruism and civic consciousness, and backbones. Sadly, 
none of these seems imminent in Houston now. However, 
we have more than 6 million residents living in our com-
munity. Hopefully, at least a few might step forward to 
begin the long process of solving the problem innovatively. 
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Following the standard protocols of qualitative re-search,61 we used multiple approaches to collect data: 
semi-structured interviews aided by archival data analy-
sis, experiential field visits and focus groups of individu-
als living in one food desert neighborhood. In addition, we 
used secondary data sources such as surveys, reports and 
academic studies to identify, clarify, probe and validate in-
formation we were getting through our primary sources. 
Our interviews and visits occurred over the course of 33 
months beginning in October 2015 through June 2018.
Semi-Structured Interviews
Our main data collection efforts involved conducting 
semi-structured interviews of relevant individuals in 
the food desert space and analyzing third-party archival 
documents. To ensure that we interviewed the relevant 
actors, we pursued a multi-pronged strategy. First, we 
read news articles, reports, web pages, surveys, and 
other documents about the food insecurity in Houston 
and elsewhere. For example, The Food Trust’s report, 
Roadmap for Encouraging Grocery Development for Houston 
and Texas,62 identified many individuals and organizations 
operating in the food desert space. These individuals and 
organizations came from a wide range of sectors includ-
ing government, non-profit organizations, foundations, 
private sector businesses and educational institutions. 
Second, we reached out to a handful of individuals and 
organizations who appeared to be prominent experts in 
this area (e.g., Houston Food Bank) in order to solicit their 
views as well as to validate names on our list. Third, as we 
conducted our interviews with our informants, as part of 
our protocol, we solicited names of other individuals and 
organizations they believed would be important for us to 
meet. Over time, respondents tended to refer us to orga-
nizations and individuals already on our list, validating 
the robustness of this data collection process. In addition, 
we used a theoretical sampling method to ensure that we 
interviewed respondents outside of these circles, especial-
ly those who appeared to hold different viewpoints about 
food insecurity.63
The vast majority of our respondents held key deci-
sion-making positions within their organizations such 
as founders, presidents, chief officers, directors, elected 
officials, agency officials and staff and funding heads. In 
addition, we interviewed respondents who were part of 
their organization’s operations and assessment teams. In 
all, this process yielded 58 face-to-face interviews with 75 
individuals at 39 organizations (for some organizations, 
we interviewed several people during a meeting; addi-
tionally, we had more than one interview with a handful 
of organizations) and telephone interviews with four 
individuals at four organizations.
Most interviews were face-to-face, generally with both au-
thors present, about one hour in length (range was about 
30 to 90 minutes), open-ended and focused on eliciting 
information necessary to structure our research efforts.64 
Our data collection focused primarily on understanding 
the organization and its activities in the moment by exam-
ining “The What?” (What is the issue? What is the role of 
your organization in this issue?), “The Why?” (Why is your 
organization doing these programs?) and “The How?” 
(How does your organization execute these programs?).
Previous interviews informed our data collection process. 
As we continued our interviews, we reframed research 
questions for clarity, concision and depth. For instance, 
we included more collaboration-related questions in our 
later interviews as collaborations emerged as an im-
portant theme from our initial series of interviews. This 
changing context is consistent with grounded theory te-
nets, whereby the data led us to emerging research ques-
tions and theories rather than seeking data to confirm or 
reject pre-determined theory-based hypotheses.65
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Experiential field visits
Our own experiences at many of the sites provided a 
second source of data. During the study period, we visited 
several food pantries, the Houston Food Bank, many 
“conventional” grocery stores (e.g., Fiesta, H-E-B, Kroger, 
Walmart, etc.), smaller grocery stores, corner stores, 
general stores (e.g., Dollar General), urban gardens, and 
farmers markets. We also occasionally attended neighbor-
hood and citywide meetings that dealt at least in part with 
food insecurity (e.g., food and housing crises in the after-
math of Hurricane Harvey). During all of these events, 
we primarily sought to look and listen, but when possible 
also engaged various stakeholders such as clients, cus-
tomers, employees and citizens.
While largely informal, such visits provided insights 
about how various stakeholders perceived these pro-
grams. For instance, we found that one pantry had ad-
opted a “user focused” approach, broadening its services 
to include, for example, registering eligible residents for 
SNAP and arranging for vaccinations, dental services and 
immigrant-related services. We were also surprised to 
discover in another pantry that because users were lim-
ited to using the pantry services just once a month (and 
that similar restrictions were the norm at most pantries), 
they spent considerable effort and ingenuity mapping 
and scheduling their visits to multiple pantries across the 
area. The additional strain associated with such ingenuity 
may limit food insecure individuals’ resources to make 
healthy choices. Food coping strategies, such as reducing 
the time and effort required for food (e.g., skipping meals, 
eating fast food), are often used to manage stress that 
“spills over” from one’s work and personal life.66 As food 
insecurity is associated with a significant risk of severe 
psychological distress,67 it is of considerable import to 
have healthy choices readily available in a manner that 
minimizes the strain for the user. This led us to wonder at 
the lack of coordination among the pantries that led to our 
thesis for the need for systemic collaboration.
Focus Groups
Through our interviews, we came across a range of 
perspectives, views and assumptions about users in the 
communities. This led us to wonder how users really felt 
about these interventions. We therefore organized two 
focus groups of individuals living in South Union/OST, 
one of the low-income neighborhoods with several food 
insecurity interventions in recent years. Held in February 
2017 and led by a professional facilitator, these focus 
groups of about a dozen persons each yielded important 
insights as to users’ perceptions about both the neigh-
borhood and food-specific concerns. For instance, in one 
focus group, respondents resoundingly expressed that 
they did not view themselves as living in a food desert, 
indicating instead that they had easy access to conven-
tional grocery stores that they considered quite close and 
convenient to reach. In another focus group, participants 
were largely unaware of or had not shopped at Pyburns 
Farm Fresh Foods, located in the neighborhood, and argu-
ably one of the highest profile food desert interventions 
undertaken to date by the City of Houston.
Data Reduction
We began recording and evaluating the information ob-
tained through all of these sources. For example, we both 
independently reviewed the transcripts of our interviews 
and other meetings we attended, reports, web pages, 
transcripts from our focus groups and other materials 
to begin to develop factors that seemed to be at play. We 
followed the standard data reduction techniques of quali-
tative analysis.68 From this process, several themes began 
to appear, such as problem ambiguity (about food insecu-
rity and/or food deserts), user roles, funders, politics and 
competitive space. From these themes, we began to group 
them into higher order factors (or “constructs”). Figure 4 
shows the Final Coding Structure. It begins with “first-or-
der indicators” of which we show some sample quotes (as 
indicated) or other facts associated with that theme. We 
group these indicators into “second-order themes” which 
are ultimately linked into “aggregate factors.”
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“ Hopefully [gardening education for kids]  
changes behavior”
“ We want behavioral [shopping and cooking] change 
and behavioral change takes time.”
“ [Most programs look for] quick wins and quick fixes.”
“ Big difference between long time and new residents”
“ First generation Hispanics [in low-income 
neighborhoods] have no problems buying and 
preparing fresh foods.”
Untargeted v. targeted (age, diseases, etc.)
“ Financing as a barrier for stores to take fresh  
foods concepts.”
“ [small NGOs] model is grant money.”
“ We get better ROI for under [age] 11 children.”
“ Competition for dollars and new dollars.”
“ Nonprofits compete by spending projection  
of competence.”
“ A lot of nonprofits don’t have data on success.”
“ [name of intervention] is a marketing tool with  
a win-win” footprint.
Definitional Ambiguity
Funders
Scope Ambiguity
Policy
Goal Ambiguity
Politics
User Roles
Resource Scarcity
Competitive Space
User Heterogeneity
Problem Ambiguity
Institutional Barriers
User Ambiguity
Mindset of Competition
“ Political reasons that Houston decided to stop  
at one project instead of more projects.
“ [City of Houston] had to work with neighborhood  
civic associations and other stakeholders to put  
public land resources towards community gardens.”
“ City [of Houston] was interested in getting this  
store built.”
“ Funders want to say what they got done.  
They like production.”
“ Data give credibility for securing funding  
from government.”
“ Donors don’t value community.”
“ Donor community doesn’t hold us accountable.”
“ Intent on defending space in the school day.  
Cross aligned with core learning objectives.”
“ Legal requirements from City of Houston Health Dpt. 
meant that certain vendors were chosen.”
“ USDA summer feeding program doesn’t work at 
schools because children don’t go there at that time. 
But Texas DOA didn’t want to lose the funds by not 
doing the program.”
Aggregate Factors
“ No time to shop and cook.”
“ [residents] don’t know how to cook properly.”
“ Need job training programs.”
“ Food culture.”
“ Goal: Get people out of a food crisis”
“ Corner store intervention is a health systems instrument.”
Improve community health
Neighborhood economic development
“ Food is a human right.”
“ Food desert is a demand problem.”
“ [Supermarket is] an economic development tool.”
“ Original impetus for community gardens is hunger.”
[There is] a public health side… diabetes type II, obesity
FIGURE 4 Final Coding Structure
First-order indicators Second-order themes
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